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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
situation presented in the principal case; thus, one may only surmise as
to what may be the result when, and if, such a question is properly
presented to our highest tribunal. There is much in the language of that
opinion, however, that would permit one to reasonably conclude that
our court would follow the reasoning of those courts placing a control-
ling emphasis upon the label given the crime committed in reaching a
decision denying recovery.17 Yet, there is nothing in the opinion indi-
cating that the policy under consideration was the comprehensive type
policy purporting to protect the insured against loss due to "theft" and
"larceny." It is not, therefore, too much to hope that our court when
confronted with such a policy will recognize that "theft" as used therein
should be given its common thought meaning, perhaps that found in
Bouvier's Law Dictionary's where theft is thus defined:
"A popular term for larceny.
"It is a wider term than larceny and includes other forms of wrong-
ful deprivation of property of another.
"Acts constituting embezzlement or swindling may be properly so
called."
CLARK C. TOTHEROW.
Recordation-Priority by-Title by Estoppel as Affected by
Timber land was owned by three brothers and three sisters as tenants
in common. One brother, without authority from the others, purported
to sell all the timber to the defendant by an unsealed instrument dated
November 15, 1946. On November 27, 1946, the sisters deeded their
interest to the three brothers, whereby each brother acquired an addi-
tional one-sixth interest in the land. On December 14, 1946, all three
brothers deeded the timber to the plaintiff, who had no actual notice of
the earlier instrument. On December 16, 1946, the defendant recorded
his instrument of November 15th. On December 18, 1946, the plain-
tiff's deed was recorded. Last, the deed from the sisters was recorded
on January 15, 1947. Plaintiff sought an injunction against further
cutting and removal of timber by defendant, to which the defendant
counterclaimed and sought specific performance of the unsealed instru-
ments against the three brothers and their grantee. Held: The unsealed
instrument of November 15 was an enforceable contract to convey, by
which the defendant was entitled to the original one-sixth interest owned
by the vendor, but the plaintiff was entitled to. the rest of the timber,
" Theft is defined as larceny. Larceny is given its common law definition
including the requirement that the taking must be under such circumstances as to
amount technically to a trespass. Great emphasis is placed on whether or not the
act of the wrongdoer meets the common law or statutory requirements of larceny.
18 BouviER, LAW DiCTiONARY 3267 (Rawle's 3d ed. 1914).
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including the one-sixth interest acquired by the brother after he had
contracted to convey to the defendant.'
SECTION I-PRIoRITY BY RECORDATION
The court ruled thatwhen the defendant registered his instrument
"he thereby established his right to receive a conveyance of the one-
sixth undivided interest... even against a person thereafter2 purchasing
such interest . . . for a valuable consideration. ' 3 It is believed that such
language was inapplicable to the facts, since the plaintiff acquired his
interest before the defendant recorded.
Where A conveys an interest in realty to B and later conveys the
same interest to C, with C recording first, our court has uniformly held
that C has the better title, saying ". . . the one first registered will confer
the superior right."4  Here C is the subsequent purchaser and the re-
cording acts have almost invariably been regarded as intended to protect
subsequent purchasers and creditors only.5 Thus under the recordation
acts the grantor retains a power6 to defeat his earlier conveyance, if not
recorded, by a subsequent conveyance to a second grantee.7 This en-
courages prompt recordation. In North Carolina, even though C has
actual notice of the prior conveyance he will prevail. "No notice, how-
ever full or formal, will take the place of recording" and since B fails
to record, C is not put on notice.8 This oft-repeated and applied
phrase is intended to give sanctity to the recording statutes. The two
phrases last above quoted are of such common legal parlance that they
are often used to reach decisions in which clear analysis would compel
different results.
The instant decision demanded such clear analysis, where A con-
tracted to convey to B, then conveyed to C, but B recorded prior to C.
Failure to grasp the distinction between this situation and the one above
mentioned where C recorded first, will lead to a trap into which some
Chandler v. Cameron, 229 N. C. 62, 47 S. E. 2d 528 (1948).
2 Italics supplied.
Chandler v. Cameron, 229 N. C. 62, 64, 47 S. E. 2d 528, 530 (1948).
'Combes v. Adams, 150 N. C. 64, 68, 63 S. E. 186, 187 (1908).
E.g., Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N. C. 550, 5 S. E. 2d 849 (1939); Glass v.
Lynchburg Shoe Co., 212 N. C. 70, 192 S. E. 899 (1937); Warren v. Williford,
148 N. C. 474, 62 S. E. 697 (1908) ; Wallace v. Cohen, 111 N. C. 103, 19 S. E.
892 (1892). As between the parties a conveyance is valid without registration,
e.g., Weston v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 263, 75 S. E. 800 (1912); McBrayer v.
Harrill, 152 N. C. 712, 68 S. E. 204 (1910); Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283(1853).
' Concerning the nature of this power, see Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Con-
ceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710, 756 (1916) ; Aigler,
The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 MIcH. L. REv. 405, 415 (1923).
5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1262 (3d ed. 1939).
'E.g., Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N. C. 550, 5 S. E. 2d 849 (1939) ; Lanier v.
Roper Lumber Co., 177 N. C. 200, 98 S. E. 593 (1919) ; Fleming v. Burgin, 37
N. C. 584 (1843).
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courts have fallen. The decision in the principal case is adverse to the
subsequent purchaser who was misled by the state of the record, caused
by the failure of B to record promptly. The court cites Combes v.
Adams,9 but in that case the subsequent purchaser recorded first, and the
holding was correct that the first recorded instrument took priority. It is
suggested that the court in the principal case could have bolstered its
opinion by citing several North Carolina decisions' ° in which strong dicta
appear to the effect that the subsequent purchaser must record first, to
obtain priority in this situation. While the dicta seem to require the
subsequent purchaser for value to register his deed before the prior
purchaser records his, such was the fact in each case, therefore these
are not square holdings that the subsequent purchaser would have lost
priority had this not been true.
In Builders' Sash & Door Co. v. Joyner,"1 as in the instant case, the
prior purchaser recorded before the subsequent purchaser. The Court
held that the prior registry should prevail, without citing any authority
to that effect, and without taking into account the considerations raised
in this note.
The North Carolina registration act is without any express provision
that the subsequent purchaser must record first to obtain priority.1 2
The majority of courts with similar statutes hold their acts do not re-
quire a prior registration of the subsequent conveyance in order for it
to have priority over an earlier executed one."" Recordation statutes
-150 N. C. 64, 63 S. E. 186 (1908).
"
0See, e.g., Tocci v. Nowfall, 220 N. C. 550, 561, 18 S. E. 2d 225, 232 (1941);
Eaton v. Doub, 190 N. C. 14, 19, 128 S. E. 494, 497 (1925); Sills v. Ford, 171
N. C. 733, 741, 88 S. E. 636, 640 (1916) ; Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C. 106, 111, 43
S. E. 579, 581 (1903) ; Maddox v. Arp, 114 N. C. 585, 588, 19 S. E. 665 (1894).K1 82 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259 (1921) (where first grantee in plaintiff's chain
of title, whose deed was prior in execution, registered his conveyance one day
after date of deed to first grantee in defendant's chain) ; accord, McHan v. Dorsey,
173 N. C. 694, 92 S. E. 598 (1917) (deeds filed simultaneously for record, one
prior in execution given priority).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-18 and 20. For a complete classification of
the statutes in the various states, see, 2 POMEROY, EQuITY JURIsRuDENcE §646
(5th ed. 1941).
", Steele v. Spencer, 1 Peters 552, 7 L. Ed. 259 (U. S. 1828) (construing Ohio
recordation act) ; Miller v. Merine, 43 Fed. 261 (1890) (construing Mo. statute) ;
Steiner v. Clisley, 95 Ala. 91, 10 So. 240 (1891); Brown v. Nelms, 86 Ark. 368,
112 S. W. 373 (1908) [contra: Glasscock v. Mallory, 139 Ark. 83, 213 S. W. 8(1919); Penrose v. Doherty, 70 Ark. 256, 67 S. W. 398 (1902)]; Van Eepoel
Real Estate Co. v. Sarasota Mills Co., 100 Fla. 438, 129 So. 892 (1930) (where
mortgagee did not record apurchase money mortgage until after mechanic without
notice completed work, mortgagee was estopped to claim priority over mechanic's
lien, though mechanic's lien was filed subsequent to recording of mortgage) ; Fein-
berg v. Stearns, 56 Fla. 279, 47 So. 797 (1890); Randell v. Hamilton, 156 Ga.
661, 119 S. E. 595 (1923) ; McGuire v. Barker, 61 Ga. 339 (1878) ; Bank of Farm-
ington v. Ellis, 30 Minn. 270, 15 N. W. 243 (1883); Craig v. Osborne, 134 Miss.
323, 98 So. 598 (1924) (where doctrine was clearly stated) ; Owens v. Potts, 149
Miss. 205, 115 So. 336 (1928) (while noting that Miss. by statute in 1924 amended
its recordation act so as to change the rule laid down in Craig v. Osborne, supra,
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of many states require priority of registry by express provision that a
conveyance is void against any subsequent purchaser "whose convey-
ance is first duly recorded." 14  Only three other jurisdictions' 5 have
been found which reach the result of the instant case without such
express wording in their acts.
A clear illustrative decision of the majority view above, where the
recordation statute is without such express provision, is Swanstrom v.
Washington Trust Co.,' 6 where the owner conveyed certain property to
the appellant on December 5, 1903. A portion of the same property was
conveyed to the respondents, for valuable consideration, on May 27,
1904. Appellant's deed was recorded June 10, 1904, and the respond-
ent's deed was not recorded until March 7, 1905. The respondents
contended their deed had priority, because they were bona fide pur-
chasers without actual or constructive notice of the prior and unrecorded
deed. The appellant contended that its deed had priority because it was
first in time and first recorded. Judgment for the respondents was
affirmed: "It is not necessary that the subsequent conveyance should be
recorded in order to gain priority, unless the statute so provides."
As pointed out by one author,' 7 "where through the neglect of the
first grantee to record his deed, a subsquent party has been led to part
with a valuable consideration, a race for registry between the two does
not afford a proper criterion by which their rights should be deter-
mined." Another author,'8 commenting on the statutes requiring sub-
sequent purchasers to record first to insure priority, notes that there is
the court applied the rule of that case because the transaction involved occurred
prior to the amendment); Sanborn v. Adair, 29 N. J. Eq. 338 (1878) ; Northrup
v. Brehmer, 8 Ohio 392 (1838) ; Turpin v. Sudduth, 53 S. C. 295, 31 S. E. 245
(1898) ; King v. Fraser, 23 S. C. 543 (1885) ; Ranney v. Hogan, 1 Posey, Unrep.
Cas. 253 (Tex. 1880) ; Nichols v. De Britx, 178 Wash. 375, 35 P. 2d 29 (1934) ;
Swanstrom v. Washington Trust Co., 41 Wash. 561, 83 Pac. 76 (1906). But cf.
Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443 (1872) (after great deliberation and several re-
hearings court decided that its statute required the subsequent purchaser to record
first by express provision to that effect, but was fully cognizant of the opposing
view in absence of such provision).
" A typical statute of this type is CAL. Civ. CODE (1941) §1214, which pro-
vides: "Every conveyance of real property, other than a lease for a term not
exceeding one year, is void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of
the same property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable con-
sideration, whose conveyanwe is first duly recorded, . . ." Insertion of such a
clause does not solve all difficulty, see, Note, 14 CALiF. L. REv. 480 (1925).
"5 Simmons v. Stum, 101 Ill. 454 (1882); Houlahan v. Finance Consol. Min-
ing Co., 34 Colo. 365, 82 Pac. 484 (1905) (Colo. adopted Ill. statute, hence the
Ill. view was followed) (see AIGLER, CASES orN TiTLEs, 848 n. 17 (3d ed. 1942)
for criticism that the Ill. court has read something into the statute) ; Whitesides
v. Watkins, 58 S. W. 1107 (Tenn. 1900) (where court felt bound by its earlier
decision of Copeland v. Bennett, 10 Yerg. 355 (Tenn. 1837), though Barton, J.,
stated that if the question was an open one, he would be of the opinion that the
law was otherwise, giving a clear analysis of the problem).
1G41 Wash. 561, 83 Pac. 1112 (1906).
'
1 Wgaa, REcoRD OF Tirr §13 (1891).5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 1276 (3d ed. 1939).
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considerable force to the opposite view and that the statutory provisions
involve a departure from the theory that a purchaser is to be protected
from a prior unrecorded conveyance because he is in effect a purchaser
without notice thereof. Whatever may be the legalistic or logical argu-
ments, it is believed that the intent and purpose of the registration acts
is to require such recordation as will provide public records, which may
be relied upon by parties about to acquire an interest in the property, to
indicate the exact status of title.19 It is believed that the instant de-
cision has just the opposite effect. The failure of the first purchaser
to record was a prejudice to the subsequent purchaser, who, by his
best efforts at the time of parting with valuable consideration, could
not determine from the record that the earlier conveyance had been
made. The first purchaser was not prejudiced by the failure of the
second grantee to record, since he had already parted with his consid-
eration. To require a subsequent conveyance of title to be recorded
so that a prior purchaser of the same property may be able to obtain
information of its existence would not be in furtherance of the general
purpose of the registration acts, which is to protect those who are en-
titled to rely on the public records from being undone by prior secret
conyevances. The instant decision in effect writes into our recordation
statute the clause noted above.2 0
It is conceivable that the present decision is an invitation to fraud.
Such might be the case where B fails to record until he hears that C
has just purchased relying on the record, and then beats C to the regis-
try. If the court is faced with such a situation it might be induced,
by such a clear instance of the obvious injustice of its present view to
change its position to that of the weight of authority. This is especially
true in view of the fact that the considerations brought forth in this
comment have never been discussed and appraised by the court. The
usual reason given by the court for its result, namely to encourage
prompt registration, is unsound in this case, for B, whose failure to
record promptly caused C's difficulty, wins under this decision.
DAVID N. HENDERSON.
SECTION II-TITLE BY ESTOPPEL AS AFFEcTED BY RECORDATION
The scope of this section is limited to the one-sixth interest the
vendor acquired after he had purported to sell all the timber to defend-
29 For avowals of such purpose, see Grimes v. Guion, 220 N. C. 676, 679, 18
S. E. 2d 170, 172 (1942); Dorman v. Goodman, 213 N. C. 406, 412, 196 S. E.
352, 355 (1938) ; Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N. C. 145, 148, 19 S. E. 99 (1894) ;
Blevins v. Barker, 75 N. C. 436, 438 (1876); Womble v. Battle, 38 N. C. 182, 190(1844) ; Fleming v. Burgin, 37 N. C. 584, 589 (1843).
" Supra, note 14.
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ant, which plaintiff claimed by a deed from vendor subsequent to his
acquisition of the interest. Plaintiff should have prevailed as to all
the timber since failure of the defendant to record until after plaintiff
purchased should give the latter priority, as heretofore pointed out.
21
The court overlooked that logic and, on the oft-repeated generality that
first on record is first in priority, ruled that defendant was entitled to
specific performance as to the original one-sixth interest owned by
vendor. However, in holding that plaintiff was entitled to the one-sixth
after acquired interest, it is believed the court failed to apply its priority
rule consistently.
Defendant based his claim to the after acquired interest on the theory
that one who purports to convey an interest in realty which he does not
own but which he later acquires is estopped to assert title thereto incon-
sistent with the conveyance.22 Historically, the estoppel depended on
the presence of covenants of warranty in the instrument, the purpose
being to avoid circuity of action ;23 today, if any part of' the instrument
shows an intention to convey a certain estate the vendor is thereafter
estopped to assert he did not have title,2 even though he has no liability
on the instrument. 5  Apparently the present basis is analogous to
estoppel in pais,N but distinguishable in that it depends solely on repre-
sentation within the instrument.
2 7
21 See Section I, supra.
22 E.g., Keel v. Bailey, 224 N. C. 447, 31 S. E. 2d 362 (1944); Shenandoah
Life Ins. Co., Inc. v. Sandridge, 216 N. C. 766, 775, 6 S. E. 2d 876, 881 (1939);
Olds v. Cedar Works, 173 N. C. 161, 91 S. E. 846 (1917) ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139
N. C. 215, 51 S. E. 909 (1903) ; Bell v. Adams, 81 N. C. 118 (1879).
For collection of decisions from other states see 58 A. L. R. 345-430 (1929),
supplemented in 144 A. L. R. 554-585 (1943).
2" BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL, 423 (6th ed. 1913) ; McGehee, Estoppel and Rebutter in
N. C., 1 N. C. L. REv. 152, 153 (1922).
",Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297 (U. S. 1850); Keel v. Bailey, 224
N. C. 447, 31 S. E. 2d 362 (1944) ; Woody v. Cates, 213 N. C. 792, 197 S. E. 561
(1938) ; Baker v. Austin, 174 N. C. 433, 93 S. E. 949 (1917) ; Weeks v. Wilkins,
139 N. C. 215, 51 S. E. 909 (1893) ; Taggert v. Risley, 4 Ore. 235 (1872).
RAwLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE, 251 (5th ed. 1887).
, BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL, 361 (6th ed. 1913); 4 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 1230 (3d ed. 1939).
. "' Stevens v. United States, 29 F. 2d 904 (C. C. A, 8th 1928); N. C. Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Moss, 215 N. C. 445, 2 S. E. 2d 378 (1939); Finch v. Smith,
171 Okla. 307, 58 P. 2d 850 (1936); Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 S. W. 2d 301
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941); see Brinegar v. Chaffin, 14 N. C. 108, 110 (1831). But
cf. Cartwright v. Jones, 215 N. C. 108, 1 S. E. 2d 359 (1939) ; Jackson v. Mills,
185 N. C. 55, 115 S. E. 881 (1923).
Perhaps an important factor in the main case, although the court did not men-
tion it, was that defendant knew the vendor owned only a one-sixth interest at
the time of the agreement. Furthermore, only the vendor signed, while the lan-
guage of the instrument was "We do hereby sell and convey all. . . " It could
be argued that the vendor never bound himself to sell unless all his co-owners
signed. If the truth appears on the face of the instrument there is ordinarily
no estoppel. Gilmer v. Poindexter, 10 How. 257 (U. S. 1850) ; cf. Ayer v. Phila-
delphia Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N. E. 177 (1893); Harmon v. Christopher,
34 N. C. Eq. 459 (1881).
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The instrument on which defendant sought specific performance con-
tained all the necessary elements of a conveyance, except for a seal.28
It is well established in North Carolina that an unsealed instrument
otherwise adequate as a conveyance of land is treated as a contract to
convey and enforcible against subsequent purchasers with record no-
tice.2 9 The court, relying on Corpus Juris, stated that the vendor, as
distinguished from a subsequent purchaser claiming under him, would,
by virtue of the instrument, be estopped to assert as against defendant
any title inconsistent with that he had contracted to convey.30 Although
certain writers have said that the doctrine of title by estoppel cannot
be applied to a contract to convey,3 1 it is believed the North Carolina
position is sound. The cases cited by these writers, and other cases in
which the principle was urged but not applied, can be distinguished on
the grounds that the courts were dealing either with void contracts or
those not purporting to affect title to realty.3 1 It is argued that the
extent of the estoppel is only to prevent the vendor from asserting a
title inconsistent with his purported conveyance, and the claim of an
after acquired title is perfectly consistent with a mere promise to con-
vey.3 3 It should be noted that the language of the instrument with
which we are concerned was not that of promise, but of present con-
veyance.3 4 Furthermore, a contract to convey land is an actual con-
veyance of equitable title,35 and specific performance is granted readily
in equity.3 6 In view of the close affinity of law and equity, it would
_8 Chandler v. Cameron, 227 N. C. 233, 41 S. E. 2d 763 (1947).
22 Chandler v. Cameron, 227 N. C. 233, 41 S. E. 2d 763 (1947); Willis v.
Anderson, 188 N. C. 479, 124 S. E. 834 (1924) ; Vaught v. Willisma, 177 N. C. 77,
97 S. E. 237 (1918). Accord, Winston v. Williams & McKeithan Lumber Co.,
227 N. C. 339, 42 S. E. 2d 218 (1947); Lumber Co. v. Corey, 140 N. C. 462, 53
S. E. 300 (1906).
20 66 C. J., Vendor-Purchaser, p. 1031 (1934). The cases cited do not involve
contracts to convey.
21 PArN, TITLES §126 (1938) ; Lawler, Estoppel to Assert at; After Acquired
Title it Pa., 3 U. OF Prr. L. REv. 165, 167 (1937).
"2 Harkness v. Underhill, 1 Black 316 (U. S. 1862) (contract void as against
public policy); Palm Springs Co. v. Palm Springs Land Co., 36 Cal. App. 2d 730,
98 P. 2d 530 (1940) (inadequate description); Harkins v. Hatfield, 221 Ky. 91,
297 S. E. 1109 (1927) (contract void as against public policy) ; Mass. Gas & Oil
Co. v. Go-Gas Co., 259 Mass. 585, 156 N. E. 871 (1927) (not a contract to con-
vey) ; Oilphant v. Burns, 146 N. Y. 218, 40 N. E. 980 (1895) (not a contract to
convey). See Bradley Estate Co. v. Bradley, 97 Minn. 161, 163, 106 N. E. 110,
111 (1906).
"
2 Lawler, Estoppel to Assert an After Acquired Title in Pa., 3 U. OF PlTT. L.
REv. 165, 167 (1937).
"4 "We do hereby sell and convey all the merchantable timber. . . . This
conveyance is made ... ." Chandler v. Cameron, 227 N. C. 233, 41 S. E. 2d 763
(1947).
"Winston v. Williams & McKeithan Lumber Co., 227 N. C. 339, 42 S. E. 2d
218 (1947).
26 "While it is universally conceded that specific performance is a matter of
discretion, the best authorities agree that where a contract relating to land is not
objectionable legally, it is as much a matter of course for a court of equity to
decree specific performance as it is for a court of law to give damages for a
breach thereof." Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N. C. 251, 253, 28 S. E. 20, 21 (1897).
[Vol. 27
NOTES AND COMMENTS
seem only logical that the doctrine of title by estoppel should apply to
any instrument which legally or equitably affects title to land.3 7
In fact, there is good authority in equity for the same results as to
the vendor, without reference to this estoppel doctrine. The fact that
the vendor does not have title at the time he contracts to sell is no bar
to specific performance, if he perfects title before performance is due. 38
If we assume, as did the court, that the instrument would entitle the
defendant to the after acquired interest as against the vendor, the next
question is whether it will be effective against others. The theory that
title by virtue of the estoppel inures by operation of law must be con-
sidered in connection with the policy of the recordation statutes to
protect subsequent bona fide purchasers of land. North Carolina has
adopted the rule that subsequent purhasers from the vendor are not
bound unless they have record notice of the prior conveyance.39 It is a
generally recognized principle that a purchaser is not required to search
the record beyond the time each vendor in the chain obtained title.
40
Obviously, as against subsequent purchasers, this rule defeats one
claiming title by estoppel if he records before his vendor obtains the
interest, since the record is off the chain of title.4 1  To prevail he must
record after the vendor acquires the interest and before the subsequent
purchaser records.42 This is exactly our case. Defendant recorded nine-
teen days after the vendor acquired the additional one-sixth interest,
and two before plaintiff recorded his deed. On previous North Caro-
lina holdings, as illustrated in this case as to the interest originally
owned by the vendor,4 defendant should have also prevailed as to the
" Allen v. Allan, 146 Ga. 204, 91 S. E. 22 (1916) ; Pring v. Swarm, 176 Iowa
153, 157 N. W. 734 (1916); Miller v. Miller, 283 S. E. 1085 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926) , Texas Pacific Co. v. Fox, 228 S. E. 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); cf. James
v. Nelson, 90 F. 2d 910 (C. C. A. 9th 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 721 (1937).8 Nolan v. Highbough, 245 S. W. 146 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1922); Dennett v.
Norwood Housing Ass'n, Inc., 241 Mass. 516, 135 N. E. 866 (1922); accord,
McNeil v. Fuller, 121 N. C. 109, 28 S. E. 299 (1897); Hobson v. Buchanan' 96
N. C. 444, 2 S. E. 180 (1887); cf. Turnstall v. Cobb, 109 N. C. 316, 14 S. E. 28
(1891).
" Builders' Sash & Door Co. v. Joyner, 182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259 (1921);
see Virginia-Carolina Bank v. Mitchell, 203 N. C. 339, 344, 166 S. E. 69, 71
(1932).
,0 Wheeler v. Young, 76 Conn. 44, 255 Atl. 670 (1903) ; Builders' Sash & Door
Co. v. Joyner, 182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259 (1921) ; Truitt v. Grandy, 115 N. C.
54, 20 S. E. 293 (1894) ; Maddox v. Arp, 114 N. C. 585, 19 S. E. 665 (1894) ;
Breen v. Morehead, 104 Tex. 254, 136 S. W. 1047 (1911). Contra: Mortgage
Security Co. v. Fry, 143 Ala. 637, 42 So. 51 (1904) ; Perkins v. Coleman, 60 Ky.
611, 14 S. E. 640 (1890) ; White v. Patten, 24 Pick. 324 (Mass. 1837) ; Tefft v.
Munson, 57 N. Y. 97 (1874); Javis v. Aikens, 25 Vt. 635 (1853).
41 See note 40 supra.
,Semon v. Terhune, 40 N. J. Eq. 364, 2 Atl. 18 (1885) ; see Builders' Sash &
Door Co. v. Joyner, 182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259 (1921); PATrON, TiasLS §45,
p. 46 (1938). If Section I, supra, is followed, he must record before the sub-
sequent purchaser takes his interest.
43 Note criticism of this holding, Section I, supra.
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after acquired interest on prior recordation. Surprisingly, the court
found that the instrument, insofar as it related to this interest, was a
mere personal contract not affecting title to land and hence not within
the recordation statute. Of course, if the instrument was not within
the statute, recordation would not give notice.44 But it did give notice
as to the original one-sixth owned by the vendor. The only possible
conclusion is that what made the instrument a personal contract as to
the one-sixth later-acquired was that it purported to convey an interest
not then owned. The only authority cited, and from which the court
apparently borrowed the term "personal contract," involves instruments
which do not purport to convey land and would not affect title to any
land whether or not the promisor owned it.
45
By the same reasoning, a deed or mortgage purporting to deal with
property not then held by the grantor would be a mere personal trans-
action and not within the recordation statutes. Obviously, if the case
is consistently followed, the whole doctrine of title by estoppel will be
destroyed as to subsequent purchasers, since it would be impossible to
give constructive notive by recordation, and North Carolina has repeat-
edly held that actual notice is inadequate. 4  A striking inconsistency
is that North Carolina recognizes the rule that where a mortgage con-
tains a clause to the effect that any after acquired property will be sub-
ject to the mortgage, recordation of the mortgage is notice to subsequent
claimants.47  Although the mortgage clause embraces property not
owned by the parties, the court has never referred to this clause as a
personal contract.
' Perhaps the court felt bound by precedent to follow North Carolina's
harsh rule of priority of recordation as to the share originally owned
by vendor, but was herein refusing to apply it to an after acquired
interest. Unfortunately, nothing in the decision, except the results, sug-
gests any such dissatisfaction or limitation on the rule of priority.
The court affirmed a holding of the lower court that title to the
after acquired interest inured to plaintiff when the vendor recorded the
deed under which he received the interest from his sisters. The impli-
cation is that the vendor acquired title only upon recording his deed.
"'Black v. Solano Co., 114 Cal. App. 170, 299 Pac. 843 (1931) (contract to
sell potential personal property) ; State v. Kirsch, 78 Ind. App. 431, 136 N. E. 36
(1932) (contract with neighbor not to sell to competitor)'; Sjoblom v. Mark, 103
Minn;- 193, 114 N. W. 746 (1908) (contract not to sell liquors on land) ; Tremaine
v. Williams, 114 N. C. 114, 56 S. E. 694 (1907) (contract to cut timber) ; see
McAllister v. Purcell, 124 N. C. 262, 32 S. E. 717 (1899) (dictum that a faulty
acknowledgment would make registration void).
"See note 44 s-upra.
Turner v. Glenn, 220 N. C. 620, 18 S. E. 2d 197 (1942).
,7 Even though the recordation is prior to the acquisition of property by the
mortgagor. Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., 150 N. C. 282, 63 S. E.
1045 (1909).
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Unfortunately, language of similar effect has continued to creep into
North Carolina decisions 4 8 although the court has expressly repudiated
the idea when the problem was squarely presented.49  It has been re-
peatedly said that an unrecorded instrument is perfectly valid and passes
title from the date of its delivery except as to subsequent purchasers or
creditors of the same grantor. 50 There are no such parties, i.e., grantees
or creditors of vendor's sisters, involved in this case, and as to all the
rest of the world the vendor had title from the date his deed was deliv-
ered. Apparently the confusion has grown out of the previously men-
tioned rule that a grantee is not bound by claims which are off the chain
of title, i.e., recorded before the grantor acquires title.51 But that does
not mean that a grantee can ignore the record prior to the time each
grantor in the chain recorded. Rather, he must take notice of the date
of the instrument under which his grantor took, which is presumed to*
be the date of delivery, and check for any claims recorded during the
interval when his grantor had title but had not put it on record.52 The
court should consider carefully whether it intends to change the law
that title passes on delivery of a deed and that outstanding liens or
incumbrances good on acquisition of title take effect at that point, and
to establish as law that this occurs instead at the time of recordation.
If the court intends any such radical change it should be done expressly,
upon clear analysis, and statement of adequate reasons. The present
practice of making occasional loose statements to that effect is intro-
ducing needless confusion into the law.
GEORGE M. McDERMOTT.
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Brock, 196 N. C. 24, 28, 144 S. E. 365, 367
(1928); see Cooper v. N. C. Bank & Trust Co., 200 N. C. 724, 725, 158 S. E.
408, 409 (1931) ; Colonial Trust Co. v. Sterchie, 169 N. C. 21, 23, 85 S. E. 40, 41
(1915) ; Note, 7 N. C. L. REv. 96, 98 n. 9 (1928). Contra: Linker v. Linker, 213
N. C. 351, 196 S. E. 329 (1938); Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N. C. 682, 125 S. E. 490(1924) (in these cases the attachment of the liens is upon acquisition of the prop-
erty, not upon registration).
"o Durham v. Pollard, 219 N. C. 750, 14 S. E. 2d 818 (1941) ; Virginia-Carolina
Bank v. Mitchell, 203 N. C. 339, 166 S. E. 69 (1932).
ro Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N. C. 550, 5 S. E. 2d 849 (1939) ; Glass v. Lynch-
burg Shoe Co., 212 N. C. 70, 192 S. E. 899 (1937) ; Sills v. Ford, 171 N. C_ 733,
88 S. E. 636 (1916) ; Warren v. Williford, 148 N. C. 474, 479, 62 S. E. 697, 699
(1908), Connor, J.: "Defendant says that until the registration of the deed R. had
no title. This is a misconception of the registration act. The title vests as against
the grantor, and all others except 'creditors and purchasers for value' from the
delivery of the deed."
. See note 40 supra.
"' See note 49 supra.
